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ENGLISH IGNORANCE OF
seed in by the English equity judges in the late eases, where the
question has arisen. We do not regard it as being of sufficient
practical importance in this country, to call for any more extended
discussion. But we have been forcibly impressed with the justice
and plausibility of the rule contended for, by those who advocate
the rights of the children to claim the benefit of their mother's
, equity from the time she elects to enforce it, and manifests that
election by filing a bill for that purpose. We think the equity
of the children is sufficiently recognised in the admitted doctrine,
that the mother cannot claim the settlement on behalf of herself
alone; she must, in her bill, demand the settlement for the bene-
fit of her children, by the marriage, as well the afterborn as
those then in existence. There could be no more distinct and
unequivocal recognition of the equity of the children, as being
to some extent subsidiary to that of the mother; and as we here
feel at liberty to follow out the doctrines of equity, as the lead-
ing of the principles involved shall indicate, we should certainly
prefer the rule laid down by Sir JOHN LEACH, to that which
seems finally to have prevailed in the English courts of equity.
I. F. R.
(To be Continued.)
ENGLISH IGNORANCE OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS.
We are naturally and justly sensitive as to the opinions expressed
by the English Press and leading men in Parliament, in respect
to the controversy in which our country is engaged. It requires
more forbearance than most men possess, to tolerate the judg-
ments pronounced by a set of supercilious, would-be-leaders of
public opinion in England, upon matters concerning the condition
and future prospects of our country. But we ought not to be
surprised at this, when we remember how utterly ignorant most
of their leading men are upon the subject of our government and
its institutions. Few people in this country can understand how
such ignorance can prevail, or the extent to which it actually
does prevail, not merely among the uneducated, but with those
who undertake to teach others.
We have an instance of this in the lectures of the distinguished
AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS.
Mr. Austin, late a Professor of Law in the London University.
Few men had a higher reputation for learning in his department
than he, and his lectures, published in 1861, were deemed au
important addition to the works on jurisprudence.
In his sixth lecture he undertakes to define the different
forms of exercising sovereign power in a state, and to illustrate the
divisiou of this power under the British Constitution, as it is
called, between the king, the aristocracy, and democracy, as
represented in parliament.
He maintains that this power of the House of Commons is a
trust, imposed by the electoral body whom they represent, but a
trust 'which can be enforced only by moral sanctions. If it were
otherwise ; if the electoral body could bind its representatives by
anything like a positive law, limiting that made by the electoral
body, the latter would be paramount to that of the law-making
power in the government.
We now quote from the language of Trofessor Austin (p. 205),
-while pursuing this thought and its illustration: " A law of the
Parliament or a law of the commons house, which affected to abro-
gate a laW of the extraordinary and ulterior legislature, would
not be obeyed by the courts of justice. The tribunals would
enforce the latter in the teeth of the former. They would
examine the competenqe of the ordinary legislature to make the
abrogating law, as they now examine the competence of any
subordinate corporation to establish a by-law or other statute or
ordinance. In the state of New York the ordinary legislature
of the state is controlled by an extraordinary legislature, in the
manner which I have now described. The body of the citizens
appointing the ordinary legislature, forms an extraordinary and
ulterior legislature, by which the constitution of the state was
directly established, and every law of the ordinary legislature
which conflicted with a constitutional law directly, proceeding
from the emtraordinary, would be treated by the courts of justice
as a legally invalid act."
The reader must be a little at a loss to know, what idea Mr.
Austin had of what he calls "extraordinary" or "ulterior legis-
lature." It would rather seem that he regarded it as a kind of
exercise of ex post facto legislation, whereby the people, at
times, might in soxne way enact a countervailing statute to some
statute already enacted by the ordinary legislature, rather than
as a fundamental law existing anterior to any act of ordinary
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legislation, and by which the validity of such an act is tested by
courts of justice expressly clothed with this power.
That he had no very definite or intelligible idea upon the
ubject, is obvious from what follows, as well as by the vagueness
5f the proposition itself. "That such an extraordinary and
ulterior legislature is a good or useful institution, I pretend not
to affirm. I merely affirm that the institution is possible, and
that, in one political society, the institution actually obtains."
Here was a learned professor teaching the science of jurispru-
dence, and the elements ahd forms of civil government, under-
taking to illustrate and explain his propositions to others by
referring to American institutions, who had made the remarkable
discovery, that in "one political society," viz., New York, they
had a something which he called "an extraordinary and ulterior
legislature;" while he was careful to say, he "pretends not to
affirm it" to be " a good or a useful institution." One would
infer that he never had read the Constitution of the United
States, or that of any state in the Union, or looked into a
volume of the American Reports, in scarce one of which the dis-
tinction between a constitution or a fundamental law and n
ordinary act of legislation is not recognised and explained, and
the extent to which the judiciary can pass upon the legality of
the acts of legislation, defined.
And yet this learned pundit was really a profound jurist, so far
as the English law was concerned, and had, moreover, in order to
prepare himself for the place he had been called to fill, spent six
months or more in Germany in studying jurisprudence, and was,
withal, a man of various learning and scholarlike attainments, and
had never studied our Constitution.
What wonder then, that we read in the columns of the English
press, and in the debates of Parliament, such crude statements
and speculations about the questions at issue between the loyal
states and the leaders of the rebellion. The simple truth is, five
out of seven of the publiQ men of England neither wish to know,
nor will they know, anything about our form of government or
the workings of our institutions. They know that John Bull is
positively right in everything, and whatever state differs from
him, must be wrong, and that it is worse than folly to undertake
to master what they are sure cannot be right. Especially is this
true of the United States. A nation, without a king, and an
established church, without a class of born gentlemen, without
landed monopolies, and the benefit of family settlements and
